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A NON-PARTISAN JUDICIARY*
By DEAN ROBERT L. STEARNS, Colorado University School
of Law, Denver, Colorado
discussion of the subject of judicial selection necessarily implies that the profession is not satisfied with
the present method of choosing our judiciary. It does
not necessarily carry the assumption, however, that all of the
defects of the administration of justice are to be blamed upon
the judges. There are unquestionably many such defects,
of some of which the public complains, of some of which the
bar complains, and of some of which the judges themselves
complain.
But the public, the bar, and the bench must
all share the respon~ibility.
Moreover, the general discussion of this subject does
not necessarily imply that there is general inefficiency among
the members of the bench. True there are some judges on
the bench who ought not to be there. But you know and
I know that most of the judges are well qualified for their
work, discharge it conscientiously, with the result which is
in the main satisfactory. But even the best of them are
seriously handicapped in the performance of their duties by
the system which we employ in their selection and maintenance.
A consideration of the problem, therefore, should carry
no odium or stigma, but indicates an awakening of the public
consciousness to a problem of general social concern, and we
all know that the agitation of thought is the beginning of
wisdom.
There are three great problems which the profession has
faced for generations and undoubtedly will continue to face
for many generations to come. The first relates to the
technicalities and inefficiencies of procedure. The second concerns the intellectual and moral standards and qualifications
for admission to the bar. The third concerns our subject
today of judicial personnel and methods of selection. These
problems of the social order are like problems of public health
-they are always with us and when we think we are making
progress in one line, a new disorder appears which we had
not anticipated.

ANY

*Address delivered October 9, 1936, at the annual meeting of the Missouri
Bar Association in Kansas City, Mo. Reprinted from Novrmber, 1936. issue of the
Missouri Bar Journal.
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The first of these ever-recurring problems to be faced
by the profession was the improvement of procedure. The
lawyers had become so wedded to the old inherited system
of common law pleading that it took generations of adjudication and legislation to produce the reform resulting
in our Codes of Practice and Procedure. However, salutary this reform may have been, it resulted in new problems and difficulties which are almost as fundamental and
serious as the original difficulty sought to be corrected. As
the result we have today a system of practice while undoubtedly an improvement over the original, is by no means
a satisfying system. One of the two major consequences of
this reform flows from the fact that because legislation has
been resorted to, the judicial initiative and energy has been
sapped and many judges even doubt the existence of their
inherent rule-making power and decline to correct patent
defects without first obtaining legislative sanction. I for
one feel very strongly that this situation is the root of much
of our present dilemma. Another consequence of this reform
of procedure again relates to the necessity for legislation, and
whereas New York and California, which first adopted the
Field Codes, have by the same legislative device so amended
the codes thus adopted that the original simplified procedure
is hardly recognizable.
In the second major problem-that of standards for admission to the bar-we have made and are making some
progress, but we have yet a long way to go. Most of the
states have adopted minimum standards for legal education
promulgated by the American Bar Association. More are
following each year, but we still have shysters and pettifoggers, and disbarments are not yet a thing of the past and
possibly will not be.
My point is that these are social problems and are dependent for their successful solution not upon a formula,
but on the human element of the eternal vigilance of an
idealistic and energetic group.
Such work is the nature of our problem of judicial selection and personnel. While we may work out a solution
that looks well on paper, it can only succeed if the lawyers
and the public generally are constantly aware of the fact
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that in selecting judges they are selecting human instrumentalities and they must regard not only the letter, but
the spirit embodied in any intelligent system of judicial selection. "The spirit giveth life."
No nation has an ideal system of selecting judges. We
are constantly cited to the example of England in matters
concerning the administration of justice. But in England
the selection is purely a political matter. In commenting
upon this phase of the subject before a conference such as
this, held by the lawyers of Ohio in 1934, Professor Edson
R. Sunderland of the law faculty of the University of
Michigan, stated as follows with reference to the English
Judiciary:
"All judges are selected by political party leaders and they are
selected among those who have rendered political services to the party.
The Prime Minister, the head of the party in power, selects the socalled titled judges-the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice, the
Master of the Rolls, and the President of the Admiralty, Divorce and
Probate Division. He selects the five Lord Justices of Appeal, and the
seven Law Lords of the House of Lords. The Lord Chancellor, the
political appointee of the party, selects all the county judges and the
ordinary judges of the High Court. The Home Secretary, another
political appointee of the party, selects all the paid magistrates who try
the criminal cases throughout England."

Thus, says Professor Sunderland, the whole system is
a strictly political arrangement for political appointment
of those entitled to reward for political services. And yet,
the judges, when so appointed are very satisfactory. Why?
Well, they have their own special remedies and safeguards.
In the first place ability is obtained by the distinctive institution of the barrister class in England. The barrister
is a specialist in court procedure. He spends substantially
all his time in court. The leading barristers are consistently competing with one another before the public eye. The
lawyers know who the best men are; the judges know and
the public knows. It would be politically very unwise to
pass over these men in the matter of judicial selection and
choose men of inferior ability as everyone would be aware
of what was done. Hence even though politics is at the
root of the system, the judicial appointments are good.
But why do these men want the office? First, the salaries are adequate. As Mr. H. G. Wells has said they "pay
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them enough to make them individually incorruptible."
Second, the English Judge has a permanent tenure of office.
Once seated, he is there for life or during good behavior and
has no need of political maneuvering to maintain his office.
Third, there are practically no promotions from a lower to
a higher court. Promotions are so few that no English judge
ever counts on them. When he takes his position on the
bench, he takes it as a life career and has no need for political
jockeying for promotion. His only function, and function
enough it clearly is, is to discharge his duty and conduct his
court as befits the tradition of the Anglo-Saxon judiciary.
In France the situation is entirely different. There is
no politics in the original appointment of judges because the
Judicial Department of the Government is a civil service
which men enter in their youth as our young men enter the
bar. They choose the judiciary as against the bar as a life
career. Long preparation and severe tests are applied, and
when these men enter the judicial profession they enter it at
the bottom of the ladder. They are given small appointments
at first, and these offices gradually increase in importance
as the occupant is moved from one position to another during
his entire judicial career, but politics is the basis of the system
involved. If a French judge desires promotion, he must keep
in touch with those who have political power, with the
Minister of Justice at the head, for advancement depends not
only upon his ability, but upon his standing with those in
government authority who are politically selected.
I have mentioned these two situations in order that we
may have them in mind when we discuss the situation in
the United States today. Here we have no barrister class
and we have no judicial civil service. Our problems are
peculiar to ourselves, and we must answer them in our own
way. Ours is a democracy-admittedly one of the most
difficult forms of government to maintain-but in the light
of the spectacle of modern continental Europe, I for one
regard it as the hope of our civilization.
It is interesting to note that the elective system for
judges obtains in only one other country, namely: Switzerland. Moreover, it has not always been the system in this
country. The appointive system existed in all the original

DICTA

colonies in the first instance, with the exception of Georgia.
About 1830, however, a definite trend of sentiment for the
popular election of judges swept over the country,. Mississippi was the first of the appointive states to employ the
elective method, and thereafter practically all of the states
followed the elective plan.
Thirty-six states now elect their judges in some manner.
Thirty-two elect them by partisan ballots. These are Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Montana, Michigan, Missouri,
Maryland, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia.
Thirteen states now use some form of non-partisan ballot.
These are Arizona, Idaho, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
Wisconsin not
only uses a non-partisan ballot, but holds a separate election
for judges on the first Tuesday in April. New Jersey conforms closely to the federal system. The appointments are
nominated by the governor and confirmed by the state senate.
In Maine, Mississippi, and New Hampshire, the governor
appoints, but a council confirms the appointment. In Connecticut the legislature selects on the nomination of the
governor. Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont and
Virginia, the legislature selects without nomination. In
Florida, justices of the supreme court are elected while circuit
judges are appointed by the governor and confirmed by the
senate. In Mississippi, the reverse is true, and the governor
nominates justices of the supreme court and the senate confirms, while judges of the circuit court are elected.
Thus we see in most of our states a system of popular
election at periodic intervals. We are today questioning the
desirability of this system because of the evils incident to
political preferment and the lack of efficiency which the
system imposes on the judges who must from time to time
go before the people and face a re-election
As a result of
this dissatisfaction, numbers of our states are experimenting
with different devices in the matter of the selection of judges.
One of our great strengths lies in the fact that we have fortyeight separate laboratories for social experimentation, and it
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is to the results of the experiments from these laboratories
that we must look for improvement in the solution of our
social and local governmental problems.
Accordingly it would seem desirable for us to examine
some of the systems which have been suggested by various
states in attempting to cope with the problem of judicial
selection.
Only yesterday the Judicial Council of the State of
Missouri in a report submitted to the Supreme Court of
this State made some very pertinent observations and submitted some recommendations striking at the evil of political
partisanship and competitive elections in the choosing of
judges.. I quote one or two paragraphs from this report as
it appeared in the press:
JUDICIARY RECOMMENDATION

Regarding the council's judiciary recommendation, the
report says:
"We are persuaded that more care and deliberation must
be given to the selection of judges.We feel that whatever success has attended the selection of judicial candidates by the
primary method has been in spite of the many and obvious
defects of that system and not because of its merits.
"We do not recommend a departure from choosing our
judges by election, but we do strongly favor the nomination of judges for the supreme court, courts of appeal and
circuit courts by conventions, composed of delegates from
the state at large, or the districts or circuits, as the case may
be, at which no other candidates shall be nominated for office,
no party platform adopted and no business of any character
transacted except the nomination of judicial candidates."
"In our judgment, the selection of candidates for judicial position by the prirxary method has not remedied the
evils of the convention system, but has produced new and
additional defects.
"The spectacle of a candidate for judicial office going
from place to place soliciting votes is humiliating. The
spectacle of a man old enough, experienced enough, wise
enough to be selected judge, being compelled to spend months,
at great expense, going from county to county soliciting votes
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in an effort to obtain a nomination to that office is to cheapen
and degrade the office. That neither the bar nor the public
is able to 'draft' a man of high attainments who might accept
the office, but is not willing to enter into a scramble to obtain
it, is enough to condemn the system.
BAN POLITICS IN SELECTING JUDGES

"Furthermore, we feel that the selection of judicial candidates should be divorced, as far as possible, from party
politics. Such nominations should not turn upon the partisan attitude of the candidate, but upon his fitness for judicial
office.

"The system of judicial conventions is not new in Missouri. It has been in existence before. We have, therefore, concluded, after most thoughtful and deliberate consideration, to recommend that all candidates for judicial
office, including circuit judges, judges of the courts of appeals
and judges of the supreme court, be nominated solely at party
conventions called and held for that purpose alone."
It is very interesting to note, however, that your judicial
council recommends in favor of retaining the elective system.
By virtue of their very nature and training lawyers are
fundamentally conservative and instinctively oppose any
modification of the existing order. You will recall that
Massachusetts from its earliest days has had the appointive
system of selecting judges who hold office for life or during
good behavior. In 1853 a convention was held in that state
at which a modification of the State Constitution was under
consideration. Many of the delegates favored a plan for
selecting judges by popular election and reducing their tenure.
In opposing that proposal in one of the most outstanding
addresses of his distinguished career, Mr. Rufus Choate said:
"Sir, in this inquiry what mode of judicial appointment,
and what tenure of judicial office, you will recommend to
the people, I think that there is but one safe or sensible mode
of proceeding, and, that is to ascertain what mode of appoint ment, and what length and condition of tenure, will be most
certain, in the long run, guiding ourselves by the lights of all
the experience and all the observation to which we can resort,
to bring and keep the best judge upon the bench. .

.

. the
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best judge for the ends of his great office. There is no other
test. That an election by the people, once a year, or an ap,pointment by the governor once a year, or once in five, or
seven, or ten years, will operate to give to an ambitious young
lawyer (I refer to no one in this body) a better chance to be
made a judge... as the wheel turns round... is no recommendation, and is nothing to the purpose. That this consideration
has changed, or framed, the constitutions to some of the States
whose example has been pressed on us, I have no doubt. Let
it have no weight here. We, at least, hold that offices, and
most of all the judicial office, are not made for incumbents or
candidates, but for the people; to establish justice; to guarantee security among them. Let us constitute the office in
reference to its ends.
"I go for that system, if I can find it or help find it,
which gives me the highest degree of assurance, taking man
as he is, at his strongest and at his weakest, and in the average
of the lot of humanity, that there shall be the best judge on,
every bench of justice in the commonwealth, through its
successive generations. That we may safely adopt such a
system; that is to say, that we may do so and yet not abridge
or impair or endanger our popular polity in the least particular; that we may secure the best possible judge, and yet
retain, aye, help to perpetuate and keep in health, the utmost
affluence of liberty with which civil life can be maintained,
I will attempt to show hereafter. For the present, I ask, how
shall we get and keep the best judge for the work of the
judge?"
Mr. Choate then proceeded to consider one by one thie
arguments submitted by the proponents of the elective method
and demonstrated, obviously to the satisfaction of the convention, that the appointive system should be retained.
I mention this incident because when we consider any
modification of the existing system we must not do so lightly
or inadvisedly but soberly, advisedly and in the light of experience and wise counsel. I commend Mr. Choate's entire
address to any group of lawyers grappling with this problem.
But let us also look at the contemporary scene. Other
states in our national union are facing and solving this
problem. What steps are they taking?
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In the Journal of the American Bar Association for last
February Mr. Paul H. Sanders, Assistant to the Director to
the National Bar Program gives a very clear analysis of the
current proposals in the matter of the choice of judges.
The first revolt in the present movement against an
elected judiciary occurred in California, where the rapidly
growing population and the increase in the amount of litigation resulted in a critical congestion of the processes of
judicial administration.
In 1932 this condition brought
about an increase in the number of the judges of the general
trial court in the City of Los Angeles alone to fifty. In
order for these judges to retain their positions, it became necessary for them to devote from twenty-five per cent to forty per
cent of their time to political activities such as meetings,
speeches, radio addresses, etc. Public dissatisfaction with the
handling of judicial business was widespread. As a result oif
this dissatisfaction, a former judge of the Supreme Court,
John Perry Wood, assumed the burden of starting a movement for a change. This movement gained support and was
allied with other similar movements of dissatisfied individuals
and organizations. Without discussing the details of how the
change was brought about, suffice it to say that as a result of
this agitation, a measure was drafted and by a petition was
placed on the ballot for the adoption of a constitutional amendment, which amendment in outline form is as follows:
"(1)

An immediate change is made as to supreme and appellate

judges. Hereafter, when a vacancy occurs in those courts the governor
appoints a successor, subject to confirmation by a commission on qualification, consisting of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, a justice
of the District Court of Appeals, and the Attorney General. The justice thus appointed holds until the next biennial general election when
his name goes on the ballot with the question 'Shall Judge Blank be
elected to the office?' If elected, he holds for the regular terms, after
which his name comes up again in like manner. If not elected, the
governor fills the resulting vacancy in the same way. The only way to
get on the bench is by the governor's appointment.
(2) As to the judges of the general trial court, no immediate
change is made, but the people in each county may, by a majority vote,
adopt the new system provided for appellate judges, as the mode of
selection of trial judges in that county."

To me the most interesting phase of this plan is the feature which requires the appointed judge at the next election to
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run without competition except as against his own judicial
record.
A recent act of signal importance has occurred in the state
of Ohio. The bar association of that state at its annual meeting in 19 3 5 approved a plan which provides that in case of the
vacancy in the Supreme Court, a judicial council, consisting
of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, a judge of the Court
of Appeals, a judge of the Common Pleas Court, a municipal
judge, a probate judge and three practicing lawyers be appointed by the governor and shall submit to the governor a
roster consisting of not less than three nor more than five
names; that the governor shall make appointment from the
list thus furnished and that the appointment shall be confirmed by the senate. At the end of the term fixed by law the
record of the judge is submitted for approval or disapproval,
similar to the plan originating in Georgia. It is interesting to
note that the Ohio Bar Association voted its approval of this
suggestion by a majority of 209 to 72.
The plan proposed by the Dade County Florida Bar
Association involves the selection of judges other than Supreme Court judges by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
which is to be followed by a confirmation by the other justices
of the Supreme Court. It is clear, however, that such a plan,
in order to guard against a very patent danger, should provide
that the appointive officer is himself to be elected and thus made
responsible to the will of the people. As I take it, the essential
quality of a democracy is to keep the selection of our public
officers out of the control of any single individual or continuous group, thus enabling us constantly to draw our personnel from the reservoir of material which is constantly
coming to the front as a result of the continuous process of
individual competition and individual development. The
great danger of our system lies in the circumstances which
requires a candidate who is willing to devote himself to the
public service, to seek his own re-election by competing with
men oftentimes inferior in ability but more resourceful in the
business of gaining popular support.
This subject has engaged the attention of the lawyers of
the state of New Mexico for the past two years. At its meeting in 1935, the subject was presented in an illuminating
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address by Judge C., M. Botts. His address so challenged the
attention of the association that prompt action was evoked.
A resolution was adopted empowering the president to appoint a committee to be charged with the duty of giving a
further study to the problem; That committee reported to
the association at its meeting in 1936 and presented to the
association a complete summary of plans which have heretofore been employed in other states, as well as those which are
now under consideration in many more, and outlined a program for the coming year whereby the best of the suggested
devices be subject to further scrutiny and discussion, not only
by the lawyers, but by other organized groups throughout the
state. One of the interesting suggestions considered by the
lawyers of New Mexico provided for the creation of a judicial
council to consist of the chief justice of the Supreme Court, the
attorney general, the president of the state bar association, and
four outstanding laymen from different parts of the state to
be selected by these three. In case of a vacancy in the office of
the justice of the Supreme Court, the council thus created shall
submit a list of five names to the governor from which he shall
make an appointment, the appointment shall then be submitted to the members of the bar association for a vote by
secret ballot on approval or disapproval. If the appointment
is disapproved, the governor shall make another selection from
the list. In the case of a vacancy in the office of district judge,
the council shall submit a list of three names to the governor
from which an appointment shall be made, and this proposal
shall be subjected to the same referendum vote of the members
of the bar association. The committee realized, however, that
such a proposal would necessitate a constitutional amendment,
and accordingly suggested certain interim improvements in the
business of selecting judges which could be made by a statutory
amendment to the end that the selection of judges could be
made with less consideration of party affiliation. The committee concluded its report with the statement that further
study was needed but quite obviously felt that progress had
been made in letting the lawyers and the people realize that
there is nothing sacrosanct about the present system and that
if it has outlived its period of usefulness, it might well now
be amended.
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Thus there is definitely observable throughout the country today a ferment of thought concerning judicial selection.
Each state must solve its own problem, but is doing so wisely
by considering the suggestions made and plans adopted by
various other states which have already taken the lead.
But whether we consider the California, the Ohio, the
Florida, or any of the other plans, certain principles appear
constant in all of them and properly so, because one of the
great strengths of any democratic government lies in the purity
of its courts and the integrity and independence of the judges
selected to sit on them. It seems desirable to remove our judges
from the necessity of political competition, a necessity which
is itself repugnant to our most qualified men, and at the same
time a cause of serious interference with the uninterrupted
performance of their judicial duties. But on the other hand,
this selection must not be so far removed from the will of the
people that we destroy that ever-present responsibility for the
administration of public office, which is the ideal of democracy.
The perfect system has not yet been evolved by any
means. The last word has not yet been said. A plan which
might work satisfactorily in one community might by reason
of local consideration be a total failure in another. The
administration of justice is a science and an art which can only
be attained by human instrumentalities, and whatever system
is employed must depend for its efficacy upon two great human
qualifications; first, the caliber of the men selected, and second,
the support and consent of an enlightened public opinion. In
the last analysis we are dealing with men, and we are dependent on them, as well as on the system which we employ for the
adequate administration of justice.
The qualities which the British poet, Sir William Jones,
himself a famous law writer, ascribed to the state over one
hundred years ago, are equally applicable today, to that great
instrument of the state, the system of the administration of
justice. You will recall his lines:
"What constitutes a state?
Not high-raised battlements nor labored mound,
Thick walls nor moated gate,
Nor cities proud with spires and turrets crowned
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Nor starred and spangled courts,
Where low-born baseness wafts perfume to pride.
But men, high-minded men,
Men who their duties know,
But know also their rights,
And knowing, dare maintain them."

MEETING OF HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION

By G.

DEXTER BLOUNT, of the Denver Bar

NEW constitution was adopted by the American Bar
Association at its annual meeting in Boston in August,
1936. The principal object was to make the Association more truly representative of the practicing lawyers in
this country. As one of the means of accomplishing that
result the new constitution provides for the creation of a
House of Delegates and invests the House of Delegates with.
exclusive authority (subject only to referendum to the membership on certain questions) to formulate the policies and to
control and direct the administration of the affairs of the
Association.
The House of Delegates is composed in part of a State
Delegate from each state representing the members of the Association in that state, a State Bar Association Delegate representing the principal State Bar Association in each state, a
delegate from each of certain large local Associations, the
Board of Governors, consisting of one Governor from each of
the ten United States Judicial Circuits, the President and
Treasurer of the Association, the Editor of its Journal and a
delegate from each of certain similar organizations such as
American Law Institute and American Judicature Society.
Altogether, the delegates directly represent a total of about
90,000 of the 175,000 lawyers in the United States.
The first meeting of the House of Delegates (except a
preliminary organization meeting held at Boston immediately

